The Comedian of Truth
Aestheticization of Cognitive Dissonance in Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morals
by Jaren Feeley
Introduction
In his seminal 1887 work, On the Genealogy of Morals: A Polemic, Nietzsche sets out to unravel the threads of Judeo-Christian morality, and unveil the sinister premises upon which it is built. Nietzsche presents an unsettling view of human history in which the pathetically weak majority of people, being ravaged by the noble and strong, rebel by adopting a poisonous interpretation of life which sanctifies and codifies impotency—the modern morality of compassion and self-denial.
The unfolding drama of Nietzsche’s text and the fruits of his investigations are striking, but of equal significance is the method by which he carries the investigation out: Nietzsche examines morality not in traditionally abstract or universal terms, but rather as an unfolding product of history and human psychology. His genealogical method thus traces a picture of an utterly subjective, naturalistic morality. But if morality has no claim to absolute truth, then we are led to ask a more fundamental question, one which lies at the heart of the Genealogy: can anything be understood as true? or are we living in a world in which everything is a matter of perspective and self-creation?
Nietzsche’s position on truth remains highly controversial, and the Genealogy in particular can be seen as presenting an ambivalent, even paradoxical view. In this essay, I will aim to present a succinct view of Nietzsche’s account of truth in the Genealogy, and discuss the paradoxes generated by his concept of perspectivism and use of truth as both the means and object of his critique. I will go on to propose that these paradoxes are not at all problematic—rather they are masterful examples of the aestheticization of cognitive dissonance, a method of affective argumentation which appeals to the aesthetic reaction to qualities of truth and paradox.
The Questionable Story of Truth
“to sacrifice all wishfulness to truth, to every truth, even the simple, bitter, ugly, repulsive, unChristian, immoral truth… For such truths do exist.—“ (GM I:1)
The above quote serves as a sort of casting off for Nietzsche’s genealogical voyage, which he insists will not yield fruit for us without “serious consideration” and “rumination”,[1] implying that one would be fain to dismiss his findings for peace of mind. And indeed for the reader there is much to be disturbed by: as the text develops a shocking assault upon entrenched moral and democratic values, it continuously reaches deeper and deeper into their purported historical and psychological roots, illustrating with grotesque detail the lurching development of morality. One of the primordial concepts developed by Nietzsche is the ascetic ideal, which attempts to explain the meaning of humanity’s widespread self-contempt, self-abnegation and inward withdrawal. The ascetic ideal manifests itself in nuanced and surprising ways in contemporary experience, but Nietzsche waits until the end of the Genealogy to dramatic unveil its secret, the “monstrous nature of its power”[2]: that even those very few philosophers and scholars who conscientiously oppose the ascetic ideal are in fact chained more insidiously to the ascetic ideal than any other, for as Nietzsche writes, “they still believe in the truth!”[3] Indeed, Nietzsche identifies the modern “core” of the ascetic ideal as an “absolute will to truth,”[4] a valuation of truth in itself. This, “the outcome of a two-thousand-year training in truthfulness”[5] through the sin-searching introspection of Christianity has led to a sanctified, metaphysical truth. Unveiled in its unholy alliance to the ascetic ideal, Nietzsche concludes gravely that “the value of truth must for once, by way of experiment, be called into question…”[6]
In these final moments of the Genealogy, we are thus presented with something of a large-scale formal paradox. For the Genealogy itself is the product of a will to truth, a polemical attempt to excoriate Judeo-Christian morality through a philosophical investigation into the “bitter, ugly, repulsive” truth of morality. Yet the project has revealed that seeking truth is itself an outgrowth of that morality which it aimed to undermine! Thus, if the Genealogy operates within the framework which ultimately needs to be called into question, the Genealogy itself needs to be called into question.
There is, however, a clear way in which the Genealogy can only be redeemed from the burden of its own results: if it can demonstrate in its form that it is not operating as a function of the absolute will to truth, but rather upon a more nuanced principle that is not implicated in the ascetic ideal. I will now turn to an earlier section of the Genealogy in which Nietzsche explores the paradoxical nature of truth, and consider how a coherent interpretation of these two sections holds the key to redeeming the Genealogy from its incriminating role as the the object of its own critique.
[1] Genealogy of Morality P:7-8
[2] Ibid., III:23
[3] Ibid., III:24
[4] Ibid., III:27
[5] Ibid.
[6] Ibid., III:25
Perspectivism and Paradox
We’ve seen that Nietzsche locates the origin and consecration of truth in the ascetic ideal—but what is truth and objectivity exactly? Nietzsche dances around this topic throughout the Genealogy, and only halfway through the final essay does he make a clear assertion on the subject. In a famous passage, he writes that objectivity is “the capacity to have all the arguments for and against at one’s disposal and to suspend or implement them at will: so that one can exploit that very diversity of perspectives and affective interpretations in the interests of knowledge.” He continues:
“Perspectival seeing is the only kind of seeing there is, perspectival ‘knowing’ the only kind of ‘knowing’; and the more feelings about a matter which we allow to come to expression, the more eyes, different eyes through which we are able to view this same matter, the more complete our ‘conception’ of it, our ‘objectivity’, will be.” [1]
Is Nietzsche asserting that there is no single objective account of truth or reality? And if so, does Nietzsche create an absurd contradiction when he makes the (seemingly dogmatic) assertion that “the only” kind of knowing is merely a matter of perspective? Nietzsche presents his account of perspectivism delicately and with very little elaboration, allowing the reader considerable play with in filling out the meaning of “perspective”, “objectivity”, and their relation to the rest of Nietzsche’s thought. Of prime interest, however, is what occurs when one attempts to understand Nietzsche’s perspectivism in terms of a universalised logical formulation—that dogmatic mode of thought which seems to closest resemble the will to absolute truth.
In attempting to formulate Nietzsche’s perspectivist thesis into a direct, logical statement, one will arrive at something such as “Perspectivism is true.” The problem should be immediately apparent: any attempt to assert such a statement results in a logical paradox, in particular a version of the infamous liar paradox (“This sentence is a lie”). This family of paradox has troubled philosophers for millennia, and has problematic repercussions for common forms of logic.[2] To explicitly state the issue: to assert the statement “Perspectivism is true,” the propositional content used to state the substance of the theory (e.g. “perspectivism”) must be assigned an affirmative truth-value, but to do so would contradict the truth of the statement as a whole.[3] Put simply, a perspectivist requires the concept of truth in order to make a statement about truth of their perspectivist position, or to assert the invalidity of the concept of truth. Construed as such, Nietzsche’s perspectivist thesis is self-refuting.
There are two traditional lines of response to this charge of logical paradox. A radically relativistic response would simply treat logical frameworks as themselves a matter of perspective, to be simply be implemented or suspended at will.[4] This radical relativism, though potentially coherent with Nietzsche’s perspectivism, seems to be at odds with Nietzsche’s larger argumentative project in the Genealogy (which remember, demands sacrifice to those “repulsive” truths which it uncovers); one is led to think in the context of Nietzsche’s writings that a subtler position is suggested. One could take the opposite approach, of logically systematizing Nietzsche’s perspectivsim in an attempt to reconcile a classical notion of truth with his perspectivism, such that there are no internal logical contradictions.[5] The success of these attempts are continually debated,[6] not least because they seem to take a highly systemic approach to the thought of a philosopher who self-consciously opposed himself to philosophical systems.[7] So strictly speaking both the radically relativist and logically systemizing positions could be coherent interpretations of Nietzsche’s perspectivism, but struggle to be reconciled to Nietzsche’s thought as a whole.
I am going to argue that the paradoxes inherent in Nietzsche’s statements on the value of truth and perspectivism in the Genealogy—far from problematizing his project—actually exemplify Nietzsche’s statements and support his philosophical objectives. Before I make this claim, I will consider the role that style and aesthetics in the Genealogy.
[1] Ibid., III:12
[2] Beall and Glanzberg, “Liar Paradox”.
[3] Hahn, “Perspectivism”.
[4] Swoyer, “Relativism”.
[5] Clark, Nietzsche On Truth And Philosophy.
[6] Hales and Welshon, "Truth, Paradox, And Nietzschean Perspectivism".
Feeling the Truth
“there is still only one kind of enemy who is capable of causing the ascetic ideal real harm: those comedians who act out this ideal—for they arouse suspicion”[1]
We have see that Nietzsche ascribes considerable importance to the role that our feelings and “affective interpretation” play in his epistemology. It is worth examining then the role that feeling plays in the polemical project of the Genealogy itself. The goal of the Genealogy is arguably to unveil to the reader the (essentially poisonous) nature of Judeo-Christian morality.[2] In doing so, it would make sense that Nietzsche would marshal philosophical and affective elements to allow us to reflect intellectually and emotionally on this morality. Nietzsche’s writing is recognized to employ aesthetic techniques such as hyperbole, exclamation, misleading irony, and shift in authoritarian perspective, and in the context of the Genelogy, these literary devices can function to “embarrass, amuse, tempt, shame, and revolt the reader”[3] in relation to their morality, and in this way bring to consciousness our emotional attachment to our moral prejudices.
Could one extend this line of thought, and see aesthetics as a way to bring to consciousness the reader’s attachment to logical prejudices—that is, to problematize the will to truth through affect? Such a device seems highly plausible—though it would have to be carried out with subtly, as Nietzsche’s thought still depends on some presence of a rational framework, and he caustically describes art as the domain “in which the lie is sanctified and the will to deceive has good conscience on its side”.[4] However, he also describes art as “fundamentally opposed to the ascetic ideal,”[5] and it is plausible that a elegant use of artistry could be deployed in acarefully targeted critique of the absolute will to truth. This is what I suggest Nietzsche has done in creating his twin paradoxes of truth.
[1] Genealogy of Morality, III:27
[2] Janaway, "Good and Evil: Affect, Artistry, and Revaluation.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Genealogy of Morality III:25
[5] Ibid.
The Aestheticization of Cognitive Dissonance
“All great things are the cause of their own self-destruction, through an act of self-cancellation: the law of life, the law of necessary ‘self-overcoming’ […] There is no doubt that from now on morality will be destroyed through the coming to consciousness of the will to truth”[1]
Indeed, from a purely logical standpoint, the Nietzsche’s perspectivism seems to lead to paradox, and Nietzsche’s utilization of the will to truth seems to call his entire project into question. However, this is exactly the point: if one mistakenly interprets Nietzsche’s text in the terms of the absolute will to truth, paradox ensues on multiple fronts, and the result is a powerful cognitive dissonance, which Nietzsche then aestheticizes by relating it to a larger philosophical explanation as to why purely abstract truth-seeking projects are themselves based in contradiction.
This aestheticization of cognitive dissonance can be analogized to that of morality: one can be given reasons as to why eating meat is bad, and then shown a series of moving images depicting the agony of slaughterhouse animals; the coming to consciousness of our emotions can provide a crucial perspective that informs our overall response. Nietzsche tells a story about the why the ascetic ideal and the will to absolute truth are vile, and in the course of the story deploys two interrelated paradoxes whose cognitive dissonance brings our problematic will to truth to consciousness. It can them become apparent that both paradoxes are deeply interrelated, and can be simultaneously—elegantly—overcome through a renunciation of the will to absolute truth. Thus the Genealogy contains not only an incisive philosophical analysis and an affective use of rhetoric that brings to consciousness our feelings about morality—but also the story artfully employs a twin paradox in order to bring to the reader’s consciousness the problematic nature of the will to truth, thus aestheticizing cognitive dissonance.
In conclusion, the aestheticization of cognitive dissonance can guide the reader towards “affective interpretations in the interests of knowledge” in the domain of truth and logic. Its implementation in the Genealogy represents a coherent interpretation of the paradoxes outlined at the beginning of the text, and can be seen as an manifestation of Nietzsche’s goal of calling truth experimentally into question. By bringing to consciousness the will to absolute truth through paradox, and providing a method of overcoming this truth, the Genealogy achieves a uniquely powerful philosophical and aesthetic coherence.
[1] Ibid., III:27
Bibliography
Beall, Jc and Glanzberg, Michael, "Liar Paradox", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/liar-paradox/>.
Clark, Maudemarie. 1990. Nietzsche On Truth And Philosophy. Cambridge [England]: Cambridge University Press.
Hahn, Songsuk Susan. "Perspectivism." Oxford Handbooks Online. 18 May. 2016. http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199696543.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199696543-e-32.
Hales, Stephen and Robert Welshon. 1994. "Truth, Paradox, And Nietzschean Perspectivism". History Of Philosophy Quarterly 11 (1): 101-119.
Janaway, Christopher. "Good and Evil: Affect, Artistry, and Revaluation." In Beyond Selflessness: Reading Nietzsche's Genealogy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. Oxford Scholarship Online, 2007. doi: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199279692.003.0006.
Swoyer, Chris, “Relativism”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2015 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/relativism/>.